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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Atkins v. Virginia,1 the United States Supreme Court held that
the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment bars the execution of mentally retarded capital offenders.2 The
Court left the implementation of procedural methods for determining
a defendant's competency for death-sentencing purposes up to the
states.3 The Court did give one clear directive in Atkins, however. In
implementing the ban, the states are to create a scheme that bars the
execution of all offenders that "fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus." 4
1. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2. See id. at 321.
3. See id. at 317.
4. See id.
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Overall, the majority of states have set forth statutory schemes that
provide procedures for identifying such an offender.5 Out of the
thirty-nine states that have capital punishment systems, 6 twenty-six
have successfully passed legislation,7 some with more debate than
others.' Eighteen of these states had already passed legislation prior
to Atkins, and eight states followed suit post-Atkins.9 This is not true
in Texas, which now finds itself in the minority.' °
In its effort to exclude the mentally retarded from execution, the
Texas Legislature has been marred by continuing debate and inaction.1 This is despite the fact that Texas leads the nation in the number of executions performed each year' 2 and despite consistent effort
on the part of the Legislature to implement such a ban, well before
Atkins and since.13 Texas's struggle to achieve a consensus within its
borders mirrors a debate now occurring at the national level.1 4
The consequences of this continuing failure are not entirely clear.
In the absence of legislative action, the Criminal Court of Appeals of
Texas has been forced to decide some procedural rules in the context
of habeas proceedings-including the definition of mental retardation
to be used, the burden of proof and party bearing that burden, and
5. See id. at 314-16, 317, n.22.
6. Death Penalty Information Center, Death Penalty Policy by State, http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=121&scid=ll (showing a total of 39 states
that implement capital punishment) (last visited Sept. 14, 2007).
7. See United States v. Sablan, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1241 (D. Colo. 2006) (noting
that 26 states as of 2006 have adopted procedural mechanisms for implementing
Atkins).
8. See Recent Developments in Utah Law, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 163, 289 (2004)
(discussing contentious debate in passage of legislation); see James W. Ellis, Mental
Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues, 27 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11, 12-14 (2003).
9. Sablan, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1241.
10. William Lee Hon, Claims of Mental Retardation in Capital Litigation, 69 TEX.
B.J. 742 (2006).
11. See id.
12. As of Dec. 31, 2005, the Department of Justice reports that Texas executed 652
people since 1930, placing it in the number one spot. Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online 31st Edition, http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/tost_6.html#6_n, (Prisoners executed, by jurisdiction, 1930-Dec. 31, 2005
(aggregate), last visited Sept. 13, 2007). See also Texas Coalition to Abolish the Death
Penalty, Total Number of Offenders Sentenced to Death from each Texas County,
http://www.tcadp.org/facts.php#factsi (last updated: November 21, 2005) (showing 281
offenders sentenced to death in Harris County, TX, alone).
13. Hon, supra note 10, at 742; Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Texas and the Mentally Retarded Capital Offender, 30 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 39, 83-86 (2004).
14. Compare Sablan, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1239-43 (holding that determination of
mental retardation should be a pre-trial determination by the court and placing burden of proof on defendant by preponderance of the evidence), and United States v.
Cisneros, 385 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570-71 (E.D. Va. 2005) (holding that determination of
mental retardation should be made by jury in the penalty phase; defendant has the
burden of proof by the preponderance of the evidence), with New Mexico v. Flores,
93 P.3d 1264, 1269 (N.M. 2004) (holding that defendant may have pre-trial determination and jury deliberation on issue).
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whether the applicant is entitled to a jury determination on the issue 15-but the state's counties have been required to fill in the gaps.
As this Comment will later discuss, whether the Atkins ban should be
implemented as a pre-trial or post-conviction assessment, the appropriate fact-finder to make the decision (court or jury), and whether
that fact-finder should be involved in the assessment of the defendant's guilt or innocence remain unanswered questions for each
county to decide.
The consequences of leaving these issues for counties to decide are
not entirely clear. The lack of a unified statutory design might lead to
procedural approaches influenced by county-level political variables,
such as the strength of the defense bar, the sitting judge's bias towards
the prosecution or defense, and the community's particular approach
on crime. Considering the importance of upholding the Atkins ban,
this potential crazy-quilt of politically-motivated approaches has
ramifications that may lead to later constitutional challenges.
This Comment will analyze the persisting area of divide that is responsible for delaying the Texas Legislature's implementation of Atkins. First, it will look at how the differing procedural approaches
represent the larger political issues in the pro- and anti-death penalty
debate surrounding the Texas Legislature's original pre-Atkins attempts to implement a ban on the execution of mentally retarded offenders. Additionally, it will provide a high-level overview of bills
introduced since Atkins was decided, focusing on the most contentious
issues that persisted from those attempts. It will also review how the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has answered some of these issues in
the interim. Finally, it will analyze how these various approaches
compare to other states that have successfully conquered this issue
and will look at how the Supreme Court is likely to determine growing
state procedural challenges.

II.

THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE TEXAS HOUSE AND SENATE

When the Supreme Court decided Atkins, many predicted that it
would result in a flood of litigation and create major confusion in
those states that had not implemented a ban.1 6 Varying testing methods, definitions of mental retardation, and differing opinions on what
15. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8-10, 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding:
(1) mental retardation would be defined according to American Association on
Mental Retardation and Texas Health and Safety Code § 591.003(13) criteria; (2) applicant was not entitled to jury determination of mental retardation; and (3) applicant
had burden of proving mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence).
16. See Ellis, supra note 8, at 21 n.38; Tony Mauro, High Court Considers Cert. in
RetardationClaims Cases, RECORDER (S.F.), May 20, 2004, available at 5/20/2004 RECORDER-SF 3 (Westlaw).
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types of evidence should be allowed in the assessment of competency
for execution purposes, make it an area ripe for contention.1 7
Perhaps surprisingly, other states have not seen the same level of
debate as Texas-or at least have settled the issues without the level
of animosity predicted by many when the Court first handed down its

holding in Atkins.1 8 There are currently only thirteen states that have
yet to pass legislation implementing the Atkins ban.1 9
In Texas, however, this prediction has been more accurate, for the

Texas Legislature has yet to implement a statutory scheme for ensuring that mentally retarded offenders are not executed.2" But Texas's
lack of a statutory ban is not the result of a lack of trying. During five
legislative sessions in the ten years prior to Atkins, the Texas Legislature made several attempts to design a bill that sets forth procedures
for identifying mentally retarded offenders with the purpose of ex-

cluding them from death row.2 1 And, since the year of the Atkins

decision, it has attempted to pass a total of fourteen bills, four created
in the Texas House and ten created in the Texas Senate, none of which
resulted in a legislative plan.22 Texas's struggle to achieve a consensus
within its borders centers around two sides of a debate now emerging
nationwide.23
17. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002).
18. See Mauro, supra note 16 (quoting James Ellis as stating, "The pitched battles
that everyone expected after Atkins haven't happened.").
19. See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 6; Sablan, 461 F. Supp. 2d
at 1241 (noting that twenty-six states as of 2006 have adopted procedural mechanisms
for implementing Atkins).
20. Hon, supra note 10, at 742.
21. Tobolowsky, supra note 13, at 39, 83-86.
22. See generally Texas Legislature Online, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us (follow
"Text Search" hyperlink; choose "78(R) - 2003" for Legislature; type "'death penalty'
'retardation' in the "with all of the words" search box; click the "Search" button)
[hereinafter 78th Legislature, Regular Session] (showing five bills-S.B. 163, S.B. 389,
S.B. 332, H.B. 614, H.B. 664- introduced during the 78th regular session) (last visited
Oct. 13, 2007); Texas Legislature Online, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us (follow "Text
Search" hyperlink; choose "78(1) - 2003" for Legislature; type "'death penalty'
'mental retardation'" in the "with all of the words" search box; click the "Search"
button) [hereinafter 78th Legislature, First Called Session] (showing four bills-S.B.
57, H.B. 18, S.B. 13, S.B. 14-introduced during the first special session called by the
78th Legislature) (last visited Oct. 13, 2007); Texas Legislature Online, http://
www.capitol.state.tx.us (follow "Text Search" hyperlink; choose "79(R) - 2005" for
Legislature; type "'death penalty' 'mental retardation'" in the "with all of the words"
search box; click the "Search" button) [hereinafter 79th Legislature, Regular Session]
(showing four such bills-S.B. 231, S.B. 85, S.B. 65, H.B. 419-introduced during the
2005 79th Legislature's regular session) (last visited Oct. 12, 2007); Texas Legislature
Online, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us (follow "Text Search" hyperlink; choose "80(R)
- 2007" for Legislature; type "'death penalty' 'mental retardation"' in the "with all of
the words" search box; click the "Search" button) [hereinafter 80th Legislature, Regular Session] (showing one bill, S.B. 249, proposed during the 80th Legislature's regular session) (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
23. Despite the lack of major disagreement in state legislatures, cases challenging
state legislative plans show a growing debate that is headed toward the Supreme
Court. Compare United States v. Sablan, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1239-43 (D. Colo.
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A.

The Real Fight Pre-Atkins: The Death Penalty Debate

In analyzing why the Texas Legislature's attempts to achieve a regulatory scheme have repeatedly stalled, it is perhaps most important to
identify possible political motivations behind the various approaches.
Where one falls in the procedural debate may be determined by
where one falls in the death penalty debate. Before Atkins was decided, whether to implement a ban on the execution of mentally retarded offenders was debated in the context of the anti- or pro-death
penalty discourse.2 4 As will be discussed in the next section, the proand anti-death penalty sides were split not only as to whether there
should be a ban, they disagreed on procedural aspects of implementing the ban as well, differing as to the appropriate fact-finder, the type
of evidence relevant in making the determination, and the appropriate
stage of the trial in which to make the determination. Although it is
not clear that the two sides of the current procedural debate are so
clearly delineated into pro- and anti-death penalty camps, the previous ideological divide may explain why getting a legislative ban into
place has been such a battle.
This Comment will next look at how the death penalty debate may
have influenced the current Atkins procedural fight. First, it will discuss a pre-Atkins bill that made it the furthest yet in the history of this
state's numerous legislative attempts-all the way to the Governor's
desk where it was promptly vetoed. Next, it will review the Texas
Legislature's post-Atkins attempts to implement a ban, analyzing how
the structure of these later attempts may have been influenced by this
earlier failure.
1. Pre-Trial vs. Post-Conviction, Jury or Court: Drawing the
Persisting Lines with H.B. 236
Ironically, the year before the Atkins decision was set forth, the
Texas Legislature got the closest to implementing such a ban, in the
form of Combined Senate House Bill 236.25 The debate generated by
C.S.H.B. 236 may help in understanding today's polarized positions in
the fight to implement a legislative plan for Atkins.
In the course of debating this bill, the contentions between the two
chambers largely came down to two issues: (1) the appropriate factfinder involved in determining the presence of mental retardation and
2006) (holding that determination of mental retardation should be a pre-trial determination by the court and placing burden of proof on defendant by preponderance of
the evidence), and United States v. Cisneros, 385 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570-71 (E.D. Va.
2005) (holding that determination of mental retardation should be made by jury in the
penalty phase; defendant has the burden of proof by the preponderance of the evidence), with New Mexico v. Flores, 93 P.3d 1264, 1269 (N.M. 2004) (holding that
defendant may have pre-trial determination and jury deliberation on issue).
24. See infra, Section II.A.1.
25. See Tobolowsky, supra note 13, at 85.
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(2) the point at which the issue should be determined, pre-trial or
post-conviction. C.S.H.B. 236 started in the Texas House as a pre-trial
measure, allowing the defendant to request a special hearing that
would involve only the court in the determination of whether he was a
person with mental retardation.2 6 In the committee review process,
H.B. 236 was amended so that the determination of mental retardation was now a post-conviction procedure, decided by the jury in the
sentencing deliberations.2 7 The House ultimately passed the bill, but
the Texas Senate refused to adopt the measure, amending it so that
H.B. 236 was again a pre-trial procedure. 28 After the House refused
these amendments, it started the process for convening a combined
conference committee to reach agreement on the bill.2 9
On May 2, 2001, the Senate Criminal Justice Committee heard public testimony on the Senate's version of H.B. 236, sponsored and authored by Senator Rodney Ellis.3 0 Proponents of the Senate's pretrial amendment were represented by University of Texas Professor
Jordan M. Steiker, Judge Charlie Baird, and Dr. Ollie Seay.3 1 Judge
Baird argued that a pre-trial determination of mental retardation by
the court would be the more efficient process, arguing that an assessment of mental retardation is closely related to existing pre-trial determinations of a defendant's competency to stand trial, and so should
be determined at the same time.3 2 Both Baird and Steiker further
asserted that in cases where the defendant is determined to be mentally retarded, a pre-trial determination would eliminate the most
time-consuming and costly part of a capital trial, namely jury selection, and therefore save the State, the victims, and all involved the
expense and emotion that a capital trial brings.33
Opponents of the ban were represented by Joe Price, then District
Attorney for Trinity County; David Weeks, District Attorney for
Walker County; and Chuck Noel, Assistant District Attorney for Harris County.3 4 Adamant against any ban on the execution of mentally
retarded offenders, Joe Price asserted that such a measure would
26. See Tex. H.B. 236, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001) (introduced version) [hereinafter Tex.
H.B. 236].
27. See id. (House Committee Report); Tobolowsky, supra note 13, at 85.
28. Tobolowsky, supra note 13, at 85.
29. Id.
30. See generally Audio file: Hearing on H.B. 236 Before the Sen. Comm. On
Crim. Justice 77th Leg. R.S. (May 2, 2001), available at http://www.senate.state.tx.us/
avarchive/?yr=2001&lim=150 (audio file available for download, click on link "May
02", relevant portion found at 2:13:47-4:09:33) [hereinafter Hearing on H.B. 236].
31. See id., testimony of Judge Charlie Baird beginning at 2:19:50, testimony of
Professor Jordan M. Steiker beginning at 2:23:29, testimony of Dr. Ollie Seay, Psychologist, beginning at 2:36:25.
32. See id. at 2:21:10, 22:22:50.
33. See id. at 2:21:20 (statement of Judge Charlie Baird); see also id. at 2:24:40
(statement of Professor Jordan M. Steiker).
34. See id., testimony of David P. Weeks beginning at 2:51:20, testimony of Chuck
Noel beginning at 2:58:00, and testimony of Joe Price beginning at 3:02:47.
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bring new opportunity to other classes of defendants that might assert
ineligibility, such as those that are mentally ill, thereby presenting a
slippery slope to the abolition of the death penalty.3 5 All district attorneys testifying argued against a pre-trial procedure, countering that
requiring a determination at such a stage would actually be less efficient.3 6 They argued that evidence of the crime itself was relevant to
an assessment of a defendant's possible mental retardation, stating
that evidence of a defendant's decision-making and planning process
is relevant to general intellectual functioning and adaptive skills.37
Therefore, these opponents argued, a pre-trial procedure would result
in a double capital trial of sorts, requiring the victim's family members
to endure the painful process of hearing the details of the crime indepth for a second time.38
A second major point of contention between the two chambers in
debating H.B. 236 was designating the appropriate fact-finder that
would make the determination of whether the offender was mentally
retarded. The original version of the bill that passed the House designated the convicting jury as fact-finder, but the Senate amended this
so that only the court made the decision, pre-trial. 39 In the May hearing on H.B. 236, Professor Steiker argued that the convicting jury
would be too emotionally invested and would likely be tempted to
reduce the issue to a mitigating factor-weighing it against other aggravating factors that show the defendant should be executed, instead
of treating it as a categorical ban.4" They argued that this would result
in allowing the jury to effectively nullify the legislative intent behind
the bill.4 1 Dr. Seay further argued that determinations of mental retardation are too complex for jurors to understand, as they lacked the
background and training needed to make a medical decision such as
an assessment of mental retardation.4 2 Proponents of a post-conviction procedure countered that jurors are frequently required to decide
complex technical and medical issues based on expert testimony, and

35. See id. at 3:03:30 to 3:04:20.
36. See id. at 2:55:29 (statement of David P. Weeks); see also id. at 2:58:05 (statement of Chuck Noel); 3:10:35 (statement of Joe Price).
37. See id. at 2:55:29 (statement of David P. Weeks); see also id. at 2:58:05 (statement of Chuck Noel); 3:10:35 (statement of Joe Price).
38. See id. at 2:55:29 (statement of David P. Weeks); see also id. at 2:58:05 (statement of Chuck Noel); 3:10:35 (statement of Joe Price).
39. Tobolowsky, supra note 13, at 85.
40. See Hearing on H.B. 236, supra note 30, at 2:23:50; see also 2:15:30 (statement
of Senator Rodney Ellis (statement beginning at 2:14:47)); 2:20:35 (statement of Judge
Charlie Baird).
41. See id. at 2:15:30 (statement of Senator Rodney Ellis); 2:20:35 (statement of
Judge Charlie Baird); see also id. at 2:23:50 (statement of Professor Jordan M.
Steiker).
42. See id. at 2:39:33 (statement of Dr. Ollie Seay).
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a jury trial is allowed for the same assessment of mental retardation
under the Persons with Mental Retardation Act.43
2. The Attempted Compromise: A Hybrid Bill
What ultimately emerged was a compromise measure. A jury determination of the defendant's possible mental retardation at the sentencing phase of the trial remained, but for those defendants that were
determined to have normal intelligence, a post-sentencing review by
the convicting court was added.44 If the court found that the defendant was a person with mental retardation, it would result in a life
sentence, regardless of the jury's previous finding." C.S.H.B 236 was
46
passed by the Legislature, but was vetoed by Governor Rick Perry.
For Governor Perry, the issue came down to protecting the jury's
status. He stated specific policy concerns of having two fact-finders
deciding the issue on potentially different evidence, stating that this
would undermine the integrity of the jury process.47 Asserting that
the bill sent a message that juries are trusted when they determine
that the convicted offender is a person with mental retardation but are
not trusted when they come to the opposite conclusion, Perry called
this an "inconsistent message."' 48 In the eighteen years the Legislature
has attempted to implement a ban on the execution of mentally retarded capital offenders, this has been the only bill to make it to the
Governor's desk.49
B.

The Post-Atkins Debate: Same Song, Different Verse

1. A Rally Cry Falling Flat
Texas's first regular legislative session after Atkins was probably the
busiest with regard to implementing the constitutional ban on the execution of mentally retarded offenders.5 0 During 2003's regular session, there was a total of two House bills and three Senate bills51
sponsored to address this issue, two of them being companion bills
See id. at 2:54:38 (statement provided by David P. Weeks).
Tobolowsky, supra note 13, at 85-86; see also Tex. H.B. 236, supra note 26.
Tobolowsky, supra note 13, at 86.
Id.
Id.; Gaiutra Bahadur, Texas Governor Vetoes Execution Ban for Retarded,
PALM BEACH POST, June 16, 2001, at 3A, available at 2001 WLNR 1614100 (Westlaw).
48. Bahadur, supra note 47, at 3A.
49. See Hon, supra note 10, at 742; see also Tobolowsky, supra note 13, at 83-86
(discussing legislative attempts from 1993 to 2001).
50. Compare 78th Legislature, Regular Session, supra note 22 (showing five bills
introduced between the senate and house); and 78th Legislature, First Called Session,
supra note 22 (showing four bills introduced between the senate and the house), with
79th Legislature, Regular Session, supra note 22 (showing four applicable bills-three
in the senate and one in the house, and 80th Legislature, Regular Session, supra note
22 (showing only one bill introduced, S.B. 249).
51. 78th Legislature, Regular Session, supra note 22.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
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that were identical-H.B. 614 and S.B. 332.52 H.B. 614 made it the
farthest, getting passed by the House on April 30, 2003, but it ultimately died in the Senate.5 3 Out of the four special sessions in 2003,
only the first brought forth an additional three bills from the Senate
and one bill from the House, all to no avail.5 4 The next regular legislative session in 2005 brought five bills between the House and the Senate; all ultimately died in committee." 5 As of the writing of this
Comment, the Texas Legislature has just started its 80th regular session, and to date there is one bill being sponsored by the Senate that
56
proposes a statutory plan for the implementation of Atkins.
2.

Pre-Trial vs. Post-Conviction, Jury or Court: The Texas
Legislature Digs Its Trenches

Post-Atkins, competing bills in both chambers continue to differ
along the same two procedural sticking points that were heavily debated in the Texas Legislature's adoption of H.B. 236: (1) the stage of
the trial in which to make the determination and (2) the fact-finder
involved in making the determination.
The fall-out from the near-hit with C.S.H.B. 236 was evident, however. Perhaps as a result of that bill's failure, the Texas House tried a
slightly different version in the next regular session, in the form of
H.B. 614. Unlike C.S.H.B. 236, which allowed for a post-verdict court
review of the mental retardation issue, H.B. 614 eliminated this judicial review, providing only for a deliberation by the convicting jury at
the punishment phase.5 7 In contrast, other approaches kept the jury
as the primary fact-finder, but with a new twist: separately empaneled
for the determination, either pre-trial or post-verdict. S.B. 163, for
example, proposed by the Senate in the 78th regular session, provided
for a pre-trial determination by a separately impaneled jury deliberat52. See generally, Tex. H.B. 614, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) [hereinafter Tex. H.B. 614];
Tex. S.B. 332, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) [hereinafter Tex. S.B. 332].
53. See generally Tex. H.B. 614, supra note 52 (showing H.B. 614's stalled progress
once sent to Senate).
54. See generally TLO-78(1) History for H.B. 18, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/
BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=781&Bill=HB18 (last visited Oct. 24, 2007); Tex.
S.B. 57, 78th Leg., 1st C.S. (2003) [hereinafter Tex. S.B. 57] (showing S.B. 57's death
in committee and companion bill H.B. 18); Tex. S.B. 14, 78th Leg., 1st C.S. (2003)
[hereinafter Tex. S.B. 14], see Tex. S.B. 13, 78th Leg., 1st C.S. (2003) [hereinafter Tex.
S.B. 13].
55. See generally Tex. S.B. 65, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005) (showing identical companion
bill H.B. 419 and S.B. 65's death in committee) [hereinafter Tex. S.B. 65];
TLO-79(R), History for S.B. 85, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005) (showing its death in committee); TLO-79(R) History for S.B. 231, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005), http://
www.capitol.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=79R&Bill=SB231 (showing
its death in committee) (last visited Oct.28, 2007); see generally Tex. H.B. 419, 79th
Leg., R.S. (2005) (showing identical companion bill S.B. 65 and H.B. 419's death in
committee) [hereinafter Tex. H.B. 419].
56. See generally 80th Legislature, Regular Session, supra note 22.
57. Tex. H.B. 614, supra note 52.
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ing just that issue, and barred that jury from being able to subsequently decide the defendant's guilt in the case.58
But in the Texas House, a consensus has emerged: the overwhelming support has been behind involving the death-qualified sentencing
jury in the decision.5 9 In fact, the Texas House seems firmly married
to this idea, as almost all its proposals since 2002 have not strayed
from this scheme.6"
When looking at just the Texas Senate on this issue, however, there
is not such a strong consensus behind allowing the convicting jury to
decide whether the defendant is a person with mental retardation. In
fact, in the Texas Senate, this appears to be a minority view. Significantly, out of the ten Senate bills proposed since 2002, only three designate the fact-finder as the convicting jury.6 This is not a sign of the
Senate's distrust of the jury in its ability to make this type of decision,
however. Instead, the primary legislative approach that has emerged
in the Texas Senate since Atkins is to designate as the appropriate
fact-finder a separate jury, impaneled solely to determine the defendant's guilt or innocence, whether pre-trial or post-conviction. More
specifically, in the sessions since Atkins, the Texas Senate has drafted
four pre-trial proposals and three post-sentencing schemes-all involving a newly impaneled jury to determine whether the defendant is
mentally retarded.62
What can be concluded is that the majority of the Texas Senate does
not trust the convicting jury to make an objective decision on this matter after having heard the evidence of the crime in question. For example, the Senate's pre-trial bills all expressly excluded the separately
impaneled jury from engaging in later deliberations during the guilt
phase of the trial.6 3 Alternatively, the post-sentencing schemes required the defendant to petition the court to hear the issue upon sentence of death by the (now dismissed) convicting jury.64 Upon the
showing of enough evidence to create an issue, the post-sentencing
bills required the court to set up a new jury to determine the question
58. Tex. S.B. 163, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) [hereinafter Tex. S.B. 163].
59. See generally Tex. H.B. 664, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) [hereinafter Tex. H.B. 664];
Tex. H.B. 614, supra note 52; Tex. H.B. 18, 78th Leg., 1st C.S. (2003) [hereinafter Tex.
H.B. 18]; Tex. H.B. 419, supra note 55.
60. Tex. H.B. 614, supra note 52; Tex. H.B. 419, supra note 55; Tex. H.B. 18, supra
note 59; Tex. H.B. 664, supra note 59.
61. Tex. S.B. 332, supra note 52; Tex. S.B. 57, supra note 54; Tex. S.B. 65, supra
note 55.
62. Tex. S.B. 389, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) [hereinafter Tex. S.B. 389]; Tex. S.B. 85,
79th Leg., R.S. (2005) [hereinafter Tex. S.B. 85]; Tex. S.B. 231, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005)
[hereinafter S.B. 2311; Tex. S.B. 249, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007) [hereinafter Tex. S.B. 249];
Tex. S.B. 163, supra note 58; Tex. S.B. 14, supra note 54; Tex. S.B. 13, supra note 54.
63. Tex. S.B. 13, supra note 54; Tex. S.B. 163, supra note 58; Tex. S.B. 85, supra
note 62.
64. Tex. S.B. 14, supra note 54; Tex. S.B. 231, supra note 62; Tex. S.B. 249, supra
note 62; Tex. S.B. 389, supra note 62.
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ously, inherent in this setup is that this post-sentencing jury can make
no further deliberations once its findings are complete.
Interestingly, an analysis combining both the Texas House and Sen-

ate approaches showed a majority of support for a post-conviction approach that requires the death-qualified, convicting jury to make the
determination if a pre-trial issue is timely requested by the defendant.
Out of the fourteen bills proposed by both chambers since 2003, a

total of seven proposed such a procedure, three from the Senate 66 and
four from the House.6 7
What is the importance of whether the determination of mental re-

tardation for execution purposes is made pre-trial or post-conviction,
by the court or jury? This question will likely be answered by both
constitutional and practical constraints inherent in the costs of a capital trial.
a. Deciding the Right Approach
On a national level, court challenges to various state criminal procedure statutes implementing the ban are starting to emerge and largely
mirror Texas's ideological struggle.68 Perhaps not surprisingly, these
national challenges largely center around the appropriate fact-finder

responsible for the mental retardation determination and the stage in
the trial proceedings in which the determination should be made.6 9
i. The Efficiency Argument

The majority of states that have adopted procedures to implement
the Atkins ban allow the trial court to determine the issue in pre-trial
proceedings.7" As discussed supra, supporters of a pre-trial procedure
argue that the cost of a capital trial weighs in favor of determining all
65. Tex. S.B. 14, supra note 54; Tex. S.B. 231, supra note 62; Tex. S.B. 249, supra
note 62; Tex. S.B. 389, supra note 62.
66. Tex. S.B. 332, supra note 52; Tex. S.B. 57, supra note 54; Tex. S.B. 65, supra
note 55.
67. Tex. H.B. 614, supra note 52; Tex. H.B. 419, supra note 55; Tex. H.B. 18, supra
note 59; Tex. H.B. 664, supra note 59.
68. Compare United States v. Sablan, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1239-43 (D. Colo.
2006) (holding that determination of mental retardation should be a pre-trial determination by the court and placing burden of proof on defendant by preponderance of
the evidence), and United States v. Cisneros, 385 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570-71 (E.D. Va.
2005) (holding that determination of mental retardation must be made by jury in the
penalty phase, defendant has the burden of proof by the preponderance of the evidence), with New Mexico v. Flores, 93 P.3d 1264, 1269 (N.M. 2004) (holding that
defendant may have pre-trial determination and jury deliberation on issue).
69. See Ellis, supra note 8, at 15-19.
70. Id. at 25-26; ACLU, Reasons to Support Pre-TrialDetermination Rather than
Post-Conviction Determination,available at: https://www.aclupa.org/issues (last visited
Jan. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Reasons to Support Pre-TrialDetermination].
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death-sentencing issues at the beginning. 1 Would this be true for
those statutory schemes that set up a separately empaneled jury, however? Requiring more than one jury in a capital trial would likely
make it so expensive to pursue capital punishment, that only the
state's counties with the most resources could even consider it.
Next, proponents of a pre-trial procedure argue that the court is a
more logical fact-finder, as it is involved in deciding competency to
stand trial, another pre-trial matter that involves much of the same
evidence.7" This certainly supports efficiency, but still leaves the issue
of whether the defendant should have the right to request a jury finding in a pre-trial hearing on the issue, instead of limiting the defendant
to just one fact-finder on an issue that will form part of the determination of whether the defendant will face a life or death sentence.
Finally, supporters of a pre-trial procedure argue that in a case in
which it was determined that the defendant is a person with mental
retardation, that would result in saving money, judicial resources, and
the extra emotional stress experienced by the victim's family when
going through a capital trial.7 3 Of course, as noted supra, whether the
family would be spared the emotional pain of a capital trial is contingent on the assessment of mental retardation involving no details of
the crime itself.7 4 Further, if it was determined in a pre-trial proceeding that the defendant is not a person with mental retardation, the
issue of diminished intelligence still would likely remain as a mitigating issue during the trial, requiring the same expert testimony.
ii.

The Due Process Argument

But, does due process require that the trial court make an initial
determination of whether the defendant is a person with mental retardation? According to Professor James W. Ellis, the attorney who successfully argued Atkins, the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v.
Denno75 provides support for this contention.7 6
1. A Defendant's Right to a Pre-Trial Court Determinationof
Mental Retardation Under Jackson v. Denno
In Jackson v. Denno, the Supreme Court held that the accused is
due an initial pre-trial determination by the court on whether a confession was voluntary or involuntary because of the jury's likely difficulty in disregarding the confession if it determined that it was based
71. See Ellis, supra note 8, at 27 n.66; see also Reasons to Support Pre-TrialDetermination, supra note 72.
72. See Reasons to Support Pre-TrialDetermination,supra note 72.
73. Id.
74. See supra, Section II.A.1.
75. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
76. See Ellis, supra note 8, at 27.
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on truth, but was obtained by coercion.7 7 The Court stated that due
process of law required the issue of voluntariness to be answered by
an "unprejudiced trier" and called it a "pious fiction" to claim that a
juror who has heard a confession can ignore it even when he has decided that it was obtained through coercive measures, no matter that
it is the juror's duty to do so. 78 Further, the Court held that "the danger that matters pertaining to the defendant's guilt will infect the
jury's findings of fact bearing upon voluntariness, as well as its conclusion upon that issue itself, is sufficiently serious to preclude their unqualified acceptance upon review in this Court ....
Jackson did not result in a ban on jury deliberation of whether the
defendant voluntarily confessed; it simply requires the court to make
an initial determination and exclude evidence of the confession if the
court finds that it is involuntary. 0 If the court finds the opposite true,
the defendant is allowed to bring the issue to the jury for final deliberation. 8 ' Further, the jury is not allowed to hear evidence that the
court has determined the confession was voluntary, as it may be unduly influenced by the court's opinion.8 2 The same special initial court
determination and subsequent jury determination procedure may be
appropriate in capital cases involving the issue of a defendant's possible mental retardation.
Jackson set forth the principle that certain constitutional rights are
so important that they cannot be subject to the legal fiction that jury
members untrained and unfamiliar with complex issues of the law will
be able to ignore their biases when faced with evidence of a defendant's guilt.8 3 Admittedly, the risk of jury nullification is present in
capital cases involving the issue of a defendant's alleged mental
retardation.
Compared to the risk of jury bias in the face of evidence of a confession, it is not as clear that a jury would experience the same bias
against a mentally retarded defendant simply because of a finding of
guilt. More importantly, Jackson seems misapplied, because unlike a
jury determining evidence of a confession, a jury reviewing evidence
of mental retardation is not using it to determine whether the defendant is guilty or innocent.8 4
What makes an Atkins determination different is whether a convicting jury can remain objective and neutral about a decision that would
be made after a finding of guilt for a capital crime-a finding often
77. Jackson, 378 U.S. at 382.
78. Id. at 382 n. 10.
79. Id. at 383.
80. See id. at 387.
81. Id.
82. See Ellis, supra note 8, at 17.
83. See Jackson, 378 U.S. at 382 & n.10.
84. See generally In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 405 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
absence of mental retardation not an element of a sentence).
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based on evidence of a violent event likely to lead to intense emotional feelings on the part of the jurors. The jury may find that the
facts relating to the defendant's guilt contaminate its ability to make
an impartial determination on the issue.85 Because the nature of such
a case is highly charged, the jurors may understandably feel emotional
about the evidence they are hearing, experiencing a range of fear, anger, and rage.86 Even if a jury member agreed with the Atkins principle that mentally retarded capital offenders should be exempt from
the death penalty, there might be a risk that he would be tempted to
ignore the law based on the facts of the crime at hand-out of sympathy for the victim or the family, or simply based on a sense of
retribution.
Another admitted possibility is that the jury will treat evidence
showing the presence of mental retardation only as a mitigating factor,
to be weighed against all the other evidence presented for death sentencing purposes, instead of a categorical bar to execution. If the jury
treats evidence of mental retardation in this way, it would result in the
nullification of the Atkins ban. 87
Although unlikely, there is some concern that it will act as the twoedged sword, possibly leading the jury to believe that the defendant
has a greater likelihood of future danger.8 8 The Supreme Court alluded to this dynamic in Atkins, noting that a defendant with mental
retardation may have an inappropriate affect during the trial, possibly
resulting in the conclusion that he has a lack of remorse. 89 The Court
further stated that such a defendant might not be able to testify to
important details, which may also incense the jury in its findings on
whether the defendant should be executed. 9°
There is evidence that a juror may actually be less likely to vote for
death based on evidence of mental retardation, however. 91 A study
conducted in 1998 showed that jurors reported being less likely to vote
for death upon the proof of mental retardation. 92 This data is tempered somewhat by data obtained from a slightly different question in
the same survey. Out of 16 jurors that actually believed the defendant
85. See Reasons to Support Pre-TrialDeterminations,supra note 72.
86. See Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75
N.Y.U.L. REv. 26, 65 (2000).
87. See Hearing on H.B. 236, supra note 30, at 2:15:30 (statement of Senator Rodney Ellis); see also id. at 2:20:35 (statement of Judge Charlie Baird); 2:23:50 (statement of Professor Jordan M. Steiker).
88. See Tobolowsky, supra note 13, at 49-50.
89. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002).
90. Id.
91. Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What do Jurors Think? 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1538, 1564, (1998) (arguing that the study of jurors
showed that evidence of mental retardation is "highly mitigating")[hereinafter Aggravation and Mitigation].
92. See id at 1564.
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was mentally retarded, seven found that data to be mitigating. 93 Just
slightly more than half the respondents, nine jurors, reported they
were just as likely to vote for death despite such evidence.9 4
Ultimately, however, this begs the question of why state sentencing
schemes should allow convicting juries to determine aggravating and
mitigating factors in favor of or against a death sentence-which may
include evidence that would relate to defendant's general mental condition-but not allow them to make the ultimate deliberation on the
issue of mental retardation. Further, jury deliberations in death sentencing cases are considered as a safeguard to ensure the defendant's
right to the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual
punishment-as the jury is a part of the special procedural
safeguards
95
required when the State is seeking the death penalty.
2.

A Right to a Jury Determination of Mental Retardation Under
Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona

Conversely, does the defendant have a right to a jury decision on
whether he is a person with mental retardation? This idea finds some
support in two Supreme Court cases, Apprendi v. New Jersey,96 decided in 2000; and Ring v. Arizona,9 7 decided in 2001; but the majority
of courts, including the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, have declined to extend the holdings in these cases to apply to determinations
of mental retardation for death-sentencing purposes. 98
Under Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 99 Apprendi's facts included a hate-crime statute that allowed an increase in sentencing if a
judge, post-jury-verdict, found by the preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant acted with a specific motive based on the victim's
race. 00 New Jersey argued that the statute required the judge to determine only whether a "sentencing factor" existed, not an element of
a crime. 0 1 The Court called the distinction of whether the motive
question was a sentencing factor or an element "elusive," and called
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
96. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
97. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
98. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); United States v.
Sablan, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1241 (D. Colo. 2006); New Mexico v. Flores, 93 P.3d
1264, 1267-68 (N.M. 2004).
99. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.
100. Id. at 468-69.
101. Id. at 467.
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the State's argument a simple re-labeling of 10a 2fact acting as an element
required in order to increase the sentence.
The Court stated that the determinative inquiry required is not
based on the form of the fact, but instead is based on what effect the
fact has in the outcome of the defendant's punishment.' °3 Significantly, the Court stated in dicta that such facts are "functional
equivalents" of an element to a crime when it exposes the defendant
to a greater punishment than authorized by the jury's verdict.1 °4 Specifically, the Court stated, "if a fact is by law the basis for imposing or
increasing punishment-for establishing or increasing the prosecution's entitlement-it is an element."'0 5 Accordingly, it found New
Jersey's hate crime statutory scheme in violation of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of10 due
process and the right of a jury trial under the
6
Amendment.
Sixth
Under Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme Court extended Apprendi's
holding to capital sentencing schemes.' 0 7 Under Ring, capital defendants have the right to have all factual questions that are required in
order to impose the death penalty decided by a jury, but limited to the
determination of aggravating factors." 8 Specifically, the Court held
that if aggravating factors operate as a "functional equivalent" to an
element of a crime, the defendant has a right to have those factors
determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.10 9 Again, the Court
held that how those factors are characterized-as factors or elements-is not dispositive to deciding whether they are a "functional
equivalent" to an element of a crime requiring the death penalty.' 0
The Court stated, "A defendant may not be exposed to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the
facts reflected in the jury verdict alone." (Emphasis in original.)1 11
Should Ring and Apprendi be extended to the determination of
facts that do not act as enhancements to a sentencing scheme, but instead act as a bar to the death penalty? Based on the language of
Apprendi's holding alone, it would seem that there is some room for
this argument. Facts that show the defendant is not a mentally retarded person will increase the chance of the maximum penalty for a
capital offense, even though it may not result in a death sentence
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See id. at 492-94.
Id. at 494.
Id. at 494 n.19.
Id. at 521 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 497.
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
Id.
Id. at 605.
Id.
Id. at 586.
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based on that evidence alone.1 12 In some cases, though, this may be
the ultimate, determinative factor in whether the defendant receives a
death sentence. Whether or not the defendant is a person with mental
retardation requires the fact-finder to weigh evidence showing its absence and showing its presence, and requires a decision as to the fact
of whether or not the defendant is mentally retarded. Applying Ring
and Apprendi in this way shows that evidence proving the absence of
mental retardation can be treated as functionally equivalent to an element of a greater offense, and therefore requires a jury finding based
on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
This would twist the Supreme Court's reasoning in Ring too much,
however. In a footnote, the Court in Apprendi foreshadowed the
Court's likely holding on this question, as it was careful to differentiate a situation in which a judge determines mitigating factors that
weigh against imposing the maximum penalty from the situation
where a judge is determining aggravating factors that enhance a
sentence:
If the defendant can escape the statutory maximum by showing, for
example, that he is a war veteran, then a judge that finds the fact of
veteran status is neither exposing the defendant to a deprivation of
liberty greater than that authorized by the verdict according to the
statute, nor is the judge imposing upon the defendant a greater
stigma than that accompanying the jury verdict alone. Core conburden-of-proof requirements are thus
cerns animating the jury and113
absent from such a scheme.
This is a logical differentiation because evidence of the absence of
mental retardation should not be considered as functionally
equivalent to an element of a crime. This would be akin to requiring
evidence of a certain minimal intelligence in order to be found guilty
of a criminal act."' While it is true that the lack of intelligence could
possibly be found to negate the requisite intent required to be guilty
of a crime, the presence of a certain level of intelligence is certainly
not evidence that intent in fact existed.
Moreover, facts relating to the absence of mental retardation will
not always be outcome determinative in deciding whether a defendant
is sentenced with death and therefore are outside the scope of the
Apprendi and Ring holdings. For example, in cases where a capital
defendant is not found to be mentally retarded, he may still avoid a
death sentence because of other mitigating factors that may exist. Or,
perhaps that same defendant did receive a sentence of death, but it
112. Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also Stephen B.
Brauerman, Balancing the Burden: The ConstitutionalJustification for Requiring the
Government to Prove the Absence of Mental Retardation Before Imposing the Death
Penalty, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 401, 410-13 (2004).
113. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490-91 n.16 (2000).
114. See In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 405 (5th Cir. 2003).
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was because of the presence of overwhelming aggravating facts. In
this way, it is easy to see that facts relating to whether someone is
mentally retarded may exempt a defendant from the death penaltybut the absence of mental retardation does not always result in a
death sentence.
The majority of courts, including the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
have held according to this same logic and have declined to extend
Ring's holding to require a jury determination on the absence of
mental retardation. 1 5 To date, only two states require a jury finding
on the issue
beyond a reasonable doubt: New Jersey and New
n6
Mexico.

3. More Legislative Lines: The Standard of Proof and Party That
Bears the Burden
Two important issues in this debate are the appropriate standard of
11 7
the burden of proof and the party to whom it should be applied.
Interestingly, there has been little disagreement in the Texas Legislature as to these questions. All bills set forth by both houses have required the defendant to bear the burden of proving the condition of
mental retardation-by a preponderance of the evidence.118
In determining this issue in Ex parte Briseno, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals noted this legislative consensus evident in a recent
bill attempted by the 78th Texas House, H.B. 614.119 The Court further noted that the Texas Legislature imposed the burden of proof by
a preponderance of the evidence in proving other similar affirmative
defenses, such as competency to stand trial, the insanity defense, and
competency to be executed. 120 Accordingly, the Court held that applicants have the burden of proving the presence of mental retardation
by the preponderance of the evidence in the context of habeas
proceedings.121
Would imposing a higher burden than preponderance of the evidence survive a constitutional challenge? Georgia, for example, im115. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 4; United States v. Sablan, 461 F. Supp. 2d
1239, 1241 (D. Colo. 2006); New Mexico v. Flores, 93 P.3d 1264, 1267-68 (N.M. 2004).
116. Margaret McHugh, Appeals Court Hands 'IQ Burden' to Prosecution in Accused Killer's Case, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), Aug. 18, 2005, available at 2005
WLNR 23843301.
117. Ellis, supra note 8, at 15 (calling these "among the most intricate and perplexing constitutional issues.").
118. See generally Tex. S.B. 332, supra note 52; Tex. H.B. 614, supra note 52; Tex.
S.B. 13, supra note 54; Tex. S.B. 14, supra note 54; Tex. S.B. 57, supra note 54; Tex.
S.B. 65, supra note 55; Tex. H.B. 419, supra note 55; Tex. S.B. 163, supra note 58; Tex.
H.B. 18, supra note 59; Tex. H.B. 664, supra note 59; Tex. S.B. 85, supra note 62; Tex.
S.B. 231, supra note 62; Tex. S.B. 249, supra note 62; Tex. S.B. 389, supra note 62.
119. Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S:W.3d at 12.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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poses a burden of proving mental retardation beyond a reasonable
doubt, while a handful of other states impose a burden of clear and
convincing evidence. 2 2 The answer to this issue is likely found in the
1 23
Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v. Oklahoma.
In Cooper, the Supreme Court held that a presumption of competence until the defendant proved incompetence by clear and convincing evidence violates due process. 2 4 The Court noted that the more
stringent burden of proof would result in the defendant bearing the
risk of a wrong decision. 125 The Court concluded that the burden of
proof by the preponderance of the evidence would not result in such a
risk, because the majority of cases did not have evidence equally
weighing on both sides.12 6 The clear and convincing standard of evidence, however, was held to affect a significant number of cases that
involved evidence showing that the defendant was more likely than
not incompetent. 1 27 The Court analyzed the outcome of such an error: trying a defendant who is not able to assist in his own defense and
who does not understand the meaning of the proceedings against
him. 128 The Court called these consequences "dire," as they denied
the defendant the constitutional protections in his right against com-

pulsory self-incrimination and his right to waive a jury trial.1 29 Ulti-

mately the Court decided that such a standard threatened to destroy
the fairness of the trial itself. 13 0
Determining mental retardation for purposes of capital sentencing
should be treated in the same fashion. Placing the risk of an erroneous decision onto a defendant who has proved the presence of mental
retardation by a preponderance of the evidence would, in the case
that he was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death, result in
the most dire of consequences.
The nature of the evidence in determining the presence of mental
retardation further determines the appropriate level of burden that
should be imposed. The majority of post-Atkins bills' 3 ' defined
122. Pruitt v. Indiana, 834 N.E.2d 90, 102 n.1 (Ind. 2005) (stating, "Georgia requires
the defendant to prove his mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition to Indiana, Arizona, Colorado, and Florida require the defendant to prove he is
mentally retarded by clear and convincing evidence. Arkansas, Maryland, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Mexico and Tennessee require proof by the preponderance of the
evidence. The federal government, Connecticut, Kansas, and Kentucky do not set a
standard of proof.").
123. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996).
124. Id. at 369.
125. Id. at 363-64.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 364.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See generally Tex. S.B. 332, supra note 52; Tex. H.B. 614, supra note 52; Tex.
S.B. 13, supra note 54; Tex. S.B. 14, supra note 54; Tex. S.B. 57, supra note 54; Tex.
S.B. 65, supra note 55; Tex. H.B. 419, supra note 55; Tex. S.B. 163, supra note 58; Tex.
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mental retardation as a person "determined by a physician or psychologist . . . to have significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning that is concurrent with deficits in adaptive behavior and
originates in the developmental period." '3 2 What type of evidence is
relevant in determining "significantly sub-average intellectual functioning that is concurrent with deficits in adaptive behavior" is subject
to debate. As mentioned previously, there is strong support for including evidence of the crime itself to be admissible for the purposes
of making this assessment. Notably, the majority of Texas House bills
allowed prosecutors to present evidence of the crime itself in order to
prove the presence or absence of mental retardation.13 3 Only three of
the Senate bills had provisions that allow this type of evidence; 13how4
ever, those that did not allow it, did not explicitly bar it either.
The majority of post-Atkins bills introduced by both the Senate and
the House had a provision that creates a presumption of mental retardation if the defendant has an I.Q. score of 70 or lower. 135 Creating a
presumption of mental retardation based on an I.Q. score has been
controversial because such scores are based on data that is notoriously
subjective and subject to doubt.' 36 Alternatively, imposing a burden
on a defendant to prove the presence of mental retardation beyond a
reasonable doubt would likely make I.Q. scores too easy for the prosecution to use to introduce doubt. Repeated testing of a defendant
often results in gradually increasing scores, possibly because the defendant becomes more familiar with the test. 13 7 For this reason, most
states require a particular I.Q. score to provide some sort of concrete
H.B. 18, supra note 59; Tex. H.B. 664, supra note 59; Tex. S.B. 85, supra note 62; Tex.
S.B. 231, supra note 62; Tex. S.B. 249, supra note 62; Tex. S.B. 389, supra note 62.
132. The bills incorporated a similar definition set forth by § 591.003 of the Heath
and Safety Code. TEX. HEALTH SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003 (Vernon 2006).
133. Tex. H.B. 614, supra note 52; Tex. H.B. 419, supra note 55; Tex. H.B. 18, supra
note 59.
134. Tex. S.B. 332, supra note 52 (allowing evidence of offense in question in
mental retardation determination); Tex. S.B. 13, supra note 54; Tex. S.B. 14, supra
note 54; Tex. S.B. 57, supra note 54 (allowing evidence regarding mental retardation
to include evidence of offense in question); Tex. S.B. 65, supra note 55 (allowing evidence of the crime itself to be presented to trial jury to determine presence of mental
retardation); Tex. S.B. 163, supra note 58; Tex. S.B. 85, supra note 62; Tex. S.B. 231,
supra note 62; Tex. S.B. 249, supra note 62; Tex. S.B. 389, supra note 62.
135. Tex. S.B. 332, supra note 52; Tex. H.B. 614, supra note 52; Tex. S.B. 57, supra
note 54; Tex. S.B. 13, supra note 54; Tex. S.B. 14, supra note 54; Tex. S.B. 65, supra
note 55; Tex. H.B. 419, supra note 55; Tex. S.B. 163, supra note 58; Tex. H.B. 18, supra
note 59; Tex. H.B. 664, supra note 59; Tex. S.B. 85, supra note 62; Tex. S.B. 231, supra
note 62; Tex. S.B. 249, supra note 62; Tex. S.B. 389, supra note 62.
136. Elaine Cassel, Justice Deferred, Justice Denied: The PracticalEffect of Atkins
v. Virginia, 11 WIDNER L. REV. 51, 55 (2004); Scott E. Sundy, The Jury as Critic:An
Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1109, 1126 (1997).
137. See Elaine Cassel, Executing the Mentally Ill and the Mentally Retarded: Three
Key Recent Cases from Texas and Virginia Show How States Can Evade the Supreme
Court's Death Penalty Rulings, FINDLAW, June 22, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
cassel/20060622.html.
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data, but also require additional testing that shows other factors that
may be impairing a particular defendant's judgment or culpability due
to mental retardation.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas noted the problematic nature of such evidence in Briseno, stating, "The adaptive behavior criteria are exceedingly subjective, and undoubtedly experts will be found
to offer opinions on both sides of the issue in most cases."13
The Court further stated:
The defense expert sees the glass half-empty, the State's expert sees
the glass half-full. Both experts relied upon the same evidence and
objective data to support their conclusions, yet the defense expert
diagnosed mental retardation while the State's expert found no
mental retardation but
139 did find evidence consistent with antisocial
personality disorder.
Therefore, given the subjective nature of the evidence and potential
confusion to the fact-finder in these cases, there might be a higher risk
in these cases of an erroneous conclusion. Further, imposing a burden
higher than a preponderance of the evidence proves the absence or
existence of mental retardation weighs against requiring any level of
proof higher than a preponderance of the evidence.
But, should the burden of proof be placed on the defendant? This
is still somewhat up for debate. 14 0 The Supreme Court has answered
this question in the context of determining competency for trial pur1 41 In Medina, the Court held that due
poses, in Medina v. California.
by
placing
the burden upon the defendant, as it
process is not violated
would give him incentive to produce all evidence possible in the proceedings determining the issue. 142 The Court reasoned that giving the
defendant such incentive would result in a truer picture of his competency and therefore would result in greater protections for him.1 43
III.

CONCLUSION

Before Atkins, Texas led the country in the number of mentally retarded offenders executed, which gave it a reputation for supporting
the execution of mentally retarded offenders, despite its efforts to enact a ban. 144 In 2001, after Governor Perry vetoed C.S.H.B. 236, one
of the bill's sponsors, Democratic Senator Rodney Ellis, publicly
138. Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
139. Id. at 13.
140. See Ellis, supra note 8, at 15-16 (calling this question a "considerably thornier
issue.").
141. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
142. Id. at 446, 455 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 455.
144. Deathpenaltyinfo.org, Execution Database (showing nationwide number of
defendants executed with evidence of mental retardation since 1977), http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions.php; (last visited Sept. 16, 2007); Fact Check
from State Senator Rodney Ellis, Mentally Retarded Offenders Executed in Texas,
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stated his disappointment at Texas's missed chance to make an important statement, arguing that Texas would appear "not only... bloodthirsty, but foolish." '4 5 He further predicted the state would find itself
forced to enact a ban by the Supreme Court and expressed embarrassment at146 the state's missed opportunity to take a "strong moral
stand.
Texas's current lag behind other states to pass legislation does not
help its reputation in this area. Texas now finds itself still trying to
close this issue three legislative sessions after Atkins was decided.
Now in its 80th Legislative Session, the Senate has proposed one new
bill creating a procedure to bar the execution of mentally retarded
offenders, SB 249.147 It is difficult to know if this session will be the
one that brings the momentum needed to move a bill to the Governor's desk for signing.
Considering how politically charged getting a ban has been in the
Texas Legislature, it seems likely that county politics will drive this
issue in the state courts as well. Lacking a "winner" in this fight will
very likely result in a county-by-county patchwork quilt of procedural
approaches that represent the local political majority's approach to
implementing the ban.
Sarah Gail Tuthill
May 30, 2001, http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/Senate/Members/Dist13/prO1/
f053001a.htm.
145. Statement of Senator Rodney Ellis, Ellis Statement on Veto of Ban on Death
Penalty of Mentally Retarded, June 17, 2001, http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/Senate/
Members/Disti 3/prOl/pO6 l701a.htm.
146. Id.
147. Tex. S.B. 249, supra note 22.
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